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JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review an order of 
the Utah Industrial Commission pursuant to §35-1-86 Utah Code Ann. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS AND OF AGENCY 
This is a Petition For Review of an Order of the Utah 
Industrial Commission. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The issues presented for review on appeal are as follows: 
1. Whether or not the Industrial Commission erred 
by ignoring competent, reliable and credible 
evidence of the industrial cause of 
Applicant's accident and by finding no 
industrial accident occurred. 
The standard of review is the "substantial evidence" standard. 
(See Willardson vs. Industrial Commission, 856 P.2d 371, 374 (Utah 
App. 1993); King vs. Industrial Commission, 850 P.2d 1281, 1285 
(Utah App. 1993)). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-86 states as follows: 
"The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review, 
reverse, or annul any order of the commission, or to 
suspend or delay the operation or execution of any 
order." 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
On February 3, 1994, Petitioner filed an Industrial Disease 
and Accident Claim with the Industrial Commission. The Petitioner 
was claiming that her on-the-job activities, which included 
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standing to watch a moving conveyor belt for approximately 11 hours 
caused her to faint and sustain a concussion and head injury. 
Defendants claim that Petitioner's recent bout with bronchitis 
and inner ear infection caused her to faint and hit her head on the 
floor and thus, denied her claim. 
The medical records indicate that Petitioner had been awake 
for approximately 20 hours at the time of the industrial accident. 
The Petitioner's treating physician, Dr. Colver reported that the 
Petitioner's fainting was probably due to a generalized weakness 
and working too hard on her feet after getting over a bout of 
bronchitis. Dr. Colver goes on to indicate that the Petitioner's 
fainting may also have had some labyrinthitis with some vertigo 
which could have been exacerbated by the motion of the conveyor 
belt. 
On or about October 12, 1994, the Administrative Law Judge 
found that Petitioner's industrial accident was not a result of her 
work activities. However, in so doing, he ignored competent, 
credible evidence that Petitioner's work activities and conditions 
aggravated her internal infirmities, causing an accident. On or 
about February 17, 1995, the Industrial Commission affirmed the 
Administrative Law Judge's decision, failing to give adequate 
weight to a clarifying letter from Dr. Colver dated March 21, 1994, 
wherein, he stated that Petitioner's physical condition was 
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aggravated by working too hard and being on her feet which could 
have been exacerbated by the motion of the conveyor belt. However, 
the Industrial Commission referred to his opinion as "conjecture". 
The Industrial Commission also failed to give adequate 
consideration to the Petitioner's emergency room physician, Dr. 
Egbert, who's report indicates that considering the nature of the 
Petitioner's work he believed that the most likely the cause of her 
passing out was motion sickness due to the watching of the conveyor 
belt going past her. However, the Industrial Commission referred 
to his opinion as "conjecture". 
The Industrial Commission also failed to give adequate 
consideration to the Summary of Medical Records submitted by Dr. 
Clark. Dr. Clark specifically states that there is a medically 
demonstrative causal relationship between the industrial accident 
and the problems for which Petitioner was treated. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
At the time of the accident, the Applicant was 75 years old 
and had been working for Stouffer Foods for only 3 days. The shift 
that she had been working, and was working at the time of the 
accident, began at 3:00 p.m. and was to end at 11:00 p.m. At the 
time of Applicant's injury she had been getting less sleep than 
normal because her sleep pattern had been disturbed by the new job. 
She had recently suffered a cough without fever, chills, sweats and 
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a sore throat, from which she was recovering. At the time of the 
accident, Applicant had completed her shift and was working 
overtime. 
The Applicant's duties consisted of standing next to a 
conveyor belt which transported frozen food and watching the boxes 
as they came down the conveyor belt. If any of the boxes needed to 
be readjusted, Applicant would do so. On the night of the 
industrial accident, Applicant had a meal break from 7:30 p.m. to 
8:30 p.m. in the cafeteria. Through-out her 8 hour shift and the 
overtime, the Applicant had been standing. Sometime shortly after 
12:13 a.m., during the overtime shift, the Applicant looked up at 
the ceiling lights and then at the boxes as they moved along the 
conveyor belt and began to feel light headed. Applicant testified 
that she did not feel ill or faint. From that point on, the 
Applicant had no recollection of what happened. Sometime soon 
thereafter, Applicant fell backwards hitting her head on the tile 
floor. The Applicant was placed in a stretcher and transported to 
Mountain View Hospital in Payson, Utah, where she was hospitalized 
for 3 days. Prior to working at Stouffer Foods, the Applicant had 
been out of the work force for a considerable period of time. On 
the day of the accident, the Applicant had been up since 6:00 a.m. 
that morning. The doctor's notes indicated that the Applicant had 
been awake for 20 hours at the time of the industrial accident. 
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In the hearing, Victoria Nelson, a Registered Nurse, employed 
by Stouffer Foods for 7 years, testified that she knew of other 
employees on another conveyor line who had become nauseous or light 
headed. Ms. Nelson testified that on the other conveyor line the 
movement of the belt would make people light headed. She stated 
that many of the people who became light headed had been pregnant. 
Ms. Nelson also testified that to her knowledge, no one had fainted 
or had light headiness problems on the conveyor line in which the 
Applicant had been working. 
Subsequent to the fall, Dr. David T. Roberts found the 
Applicant had an abnormal EEC However, it is not clear from the 
medical records whether the abnormal EEG occurred as a result of 
the fall or was present prior to the fall. 
The Administrative Law Judge states that, "On December 7, 
1993, Dr. Colver reported that he suspected that the fall was due 
to a syncope based upon a generalized weakness due to resolving 
bronchitis and possibly due to mild labyrinthitis exacerbated by 
working on her feet at a moving conveyor belt all day." (See Page 
3 of Order) The Industrial Commission also stated that Dr. 
Colver's opinion of the cause of the fall was conjecture (See 
Addendum E page 3). However, what Dr. Colver stated was: 
Syncope. This is probably due to a 
generalized weakness and working too hard on 
her feet after getting over a bout of 
bronchitis. She may have also had some 
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labyrinthitis with some vertigo which could 
have been exacerbated by the motion of the 
conveyor belt. (Emphasis added) (See Addendum 
A). 
The Administrative Law Judge also failed to mention, and the 
Industrial Commission ignored a letter from Dr. Colver, dated March 
21, 1994, which was submitted by the Applicant. Said letter 
stated: 
In response to your questions in the letter 
dated March 12, 1994, you asked if my report 
states that you had a inflammation of the 
inner ear prior to the accident. The letter 
from Mr. Keith F. Walquist, dated March 8, 
1994, states: "also he reported that you had a 
inflammation of the inner ear which could 
cause vertigo11. 
Mr. Walquist is misquoting me. My note dated 
7-7-93, says that she may have also had some 
labyrinthitis with some vertigo. Thus, I did 
not say that you had an inflammation of the 
inner ear, I merely hypothesized that it was 
possible. 
There is no way of knowing from my reports or 
examination if you had a inflammation of the 
inner ear prior to the accident. 
I did feel the most likely cause of your 
fainting was, "due to a generalized weakness 
and working too hard on your feet after 
getting over a bout of bronchitis". My 
records indicate that you had a cough from 
which you were recovering when you went back 
to work and had the accident...(Emphasis 
added). 
(See Addendum B) 
The Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial Commission 
also failed to give adequate consideration to a letter of December 
7 
14, 1993, from the Applicant's emergency room physician, Dr. L. 
Dean Egbert. Dr. Egbert states the following: 
Mrs. Brunson is a 74 year old women that I saw 
in the emergency department on 12-7-93, after 
falling while working at a conveyor belt while 
working at Stouffers. She had been working 
there for only 2 days, she did not feel any 
spinning sensation, simply became light 
headed, passed out, hit her head on the floor 
sustaining a contusion of her brain. She was 
admitted to the hospital. As far as I know, 
no other specific cause of the blacking-out 
episode was found. Considering the nature of 
this work I think that the most likely cause 
of her passing out was motion sickness due to 
watching the conveyor belt go passed (sic) 
her. (Emphasis added) 
(See Addendum C) 
The Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial Commission 
also failed to give proper weight to the Summary of Medical Record 
which was signed by Dr. John R. Clark, the Applicant's 
neurosurgeon. In said Summary of Medical Records, it is 
specifically stated that there is a medically demonstrative causal 
relationship between the industrial accident and the problems for 
which she was treated. (See Addendum D) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Commission ignored and disregarded competent, reliable and 
credible evidence from the petitioner's treating physicians when it 
found that the petitioner's industrial injury was caused by a pre-
existing condition rather than as a result of her fainting while 
watching the conveyor belt. 
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DETAIL OF ARGUMENT 
I 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION IGNORED COMPETENT, RELIABLE 
AND CREDIBLE EVIDENCE WHEN IT FOUND THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE 
WHICH MEETS THE STANDARD OF REASONABLE MEDICAL PROBABILITY AS TO AN 
INDUSTRIAL CAUSE OF THE APPLICANT'S ACCIDENT. 
The Court of Appeals has authority to reverse the Industrial 
Commission's Order. (See U.C.A. §35-1-86). The standard applied 
by the Court of Appeals in reviewing the Industrial Commission's 
Order is "substantial evidence". (See Willardson vs. Industrial 
Commission, 856 P.2d 371, 374 (Utah App. 1993); King vs. Industrial 
Commission, 850 P.2d 1281, 1285 (Utah App. 1993)). "Substantial 
evidence" is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. (See Willardson vs. 
Industrial Commission, 856 P.2d 371, 374 (Utah App. 1993). 
The Industrial Commission adopted the Administrative Law 
Judge's Findings of Fact (See Addendum F page 1). Thus, this 
appeal includes issues covered in the Administrative Law Judge's 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order. 
The Industrial Commission arbitrarily disregarded competent 
evidence when it affirmed the Administrative Law Judge and found 
that the applicant had failed to establish medical causation. In 
Nicholson vs. Industrial Commission of Utah, 389 P.2d 730 (Utah 
1964), the Supreme Court recognized the fact that it would not 
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disturb the findings or the order of the Commission if they were 
supported by "substantial evidence". However, at the same time 
they recognized that the Supreme Court has a duty, particularly 
with reference to the denial of compensation, to determine whether 
the Commission has arbitrarily disregarded competent evidence in 
making its decision. 
In the Administrative Law Judge's Findings, the last paragraph 
on page three, it states: 
A preponderance of evidence shows that Mrs. 
Brunson's injury coincidentally occurred at 
work because of her idiopathic condition 
without any enhancement from the work place. 
Although, there has been speculation about why 
she had the fainting episode there is no 
evidence which can be set-forth which meets 
the standard of a reasonable medical 
probability. (See Addendum E) 
"Medical causation demands that petitioner 'prove (his) 
disability is medically the result of a exertion or injury that 
occurred during a work-related activity.'" Allen vs. Industrial 
Commission, 729 P.2d 15, 27 (Utah 1986). "'The key question in 
determining causation is whether given this body and this exertion, 
the exertion in fact contributed to the injury.'" Stouffer Foods 
Corp. vs. Industrial Comm'n, 801 P.2d 179, 182 (Utah App. 1990) 
(quoting Allen, 729 P.2d at 24). In order to answer this question, 
we must focus on what exertions by Petitioner are involved. See 
id.; Nyrehn vs. Industrial Comm'n, 800 P.2d 330, 334 (Utah App. 
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1990), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991). 
As mentioned in the Statement of Facts, Dr. Colver stated on 
two occasions, that although, petitioner's physical condition was 
weaker than usual, it was aggravated by, "...working too hard on 
her feet..." and "...could have been exacerbated by the motion of 
the conveyor belt". In his clarifying letter of March 21, 1994, 
Dr. Colver goes on to state in more definitive terms, "I do feel 
the most likely cause of your fainting was, 'due to a generalized 
weakness and working too hard on your feet after getting over a 
bout a bronchitis'". (emphasis added). 
As also pointed out in the Statement of Facts herein, the 
December 14, 1993, letter of L. Dean Egbert, M.D., the emergency 
room physician, stated, also in definitive terms, his opinion of 
the cause of the Applicant's injury. He stated: 
Considering the nature of this work, I think 
the mostly likely cause of her passing out was 
motion sickness due to watching the conveyor 
belt go passed her. (emphasis added). 
The Administrative Law Judge states in his Findings that there 
was no evidence that had been set-forth which meets the standard of 
a reasonable medical probability. The definition of medical 
probability, according to the AMA Guides to the Evaluation of 
Permanent Impairment, Fourth Edition, page 318, is as follows: 
Possibility. Probabilityi These are terms that 
refer to the likelihood or chance that an 
injury or illness was caused or aggravated by 
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a particular factor. "Possibility" sometimes 
is used to imply a likelihood of less than 
50%; "probability" sometimes is used to imply 
likelihood of greater than 50%. (See Addendum 
G). 
The opinions of Dr. Colver and Dr. Egbert both state, "the 
most likely cause" of the Applicant's injury was due to working too 
hard, being on her feet for extended period of time, and motion 
sickness from watching the conveyor belt. The words, "most likely 
cause" certainly indicate that, in their medical opinion, there is 
more than a 50% likelihood that the of the cause of the accident 
was the Applicant being on her feet for an extended period of time, 
working too hard, and motion sickness from watching the conveyor 
belt. Thus, both treating physicians opined that it was medically 
probable that the cause of the accident was industrially related. 
Consequently, the Administrative Law Judge ignored opinions of 
reasonable medical probability from the two treating physicians 
that the injury was in fact caused by conditions of the Applicant's 
employment. Dr. Clark's opinion that petitioner's injury was 
directly related to an industrial accident compounds further the 
evidence in favor of petitioner. 
It is well established that if a pre-existing condition is 
aggravated by working conditions, resulting in an injury, as long 
as the activity which caused the injury was extraordinary in 
nature, causation is established and workers compensation benefits 
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should be ordered. (See Allen vs. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 
15 (Utah 1986)). Certainly, standing on one's feet for nine or more 
hours watching a conveyor belt would be considered an extraordinary 
activity. An ordinary 20th century person would not usually engage 
in a similar exertion in everyday, nonindustrial life. (See Allen 
vs. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986)). As is set-
forth herein, the Applicant did not suffer from an idiopathic fall. 
The Applicant was recovering from some pre-existing conditions, and 
consequently, may have been in a weakened state. However, as 
stated by the opinions of Dr. Colver and Dr. Egbert, it is more 
than likely that the cause of the accident was the aggravation of 
those pre-existing conditions by the long hours the Applicant was 
working, standing on her feet the entire time and the motion 
sickness that she incurred by watching the conveyor belt. This is 
also supported by the testimony of Victoria Nelson, the Registered 
Nurse employed by Stouffer Foods, who testified that other 
employees at Stouffer Foods had become nauseous and light headed by 
watching the conveyor belt. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioner requests that this Court find that the Commission, 
in denying petitioner's application for benefits, arbitrarily 
disregarded competent evidence in when it determined that the 
petitioner's job-related-activities did not cause the industrial 
13 
accident. There simply is no evidence to indicate otherwise. 
Thus, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court enter an 
Order reversing the Industrial Commission's Order in this matter. 
DATED this J ^ day of July, 1995. 
. FREE WAYNE A STONE 
Attorney for Applicant 
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ADDENDUM 
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ADDENDUM A 
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MOUNTAIN VIEW HOSPITAL 
1000 East, U.S. Highway 6 
Payson, Utah 84651 
INTERNAL MEDICINE CONSULTATION REPORT 
Name: Brunson, Reba 
Hosp. #: 01 36 75 
Date: 12-7-93 
Consulting Physician: Kevin J. Colver, M.D. 
Referring Physician: John R. Clark, M.D. 
CHIEF COMPLAINT: 
This is a 75-year-old white female patient admitted by Dr. Clark 
because of syncope and cerebral contusion. 
HISTORY OF PRESENT ILLNESS: 
The patient recently had a cough without fevers, chills, sweats, or 
sore throat from which she was recovering. She returned to her new 
job working at a conveyer belt at Stouffer's yesterday evening and 
after standing for almost her complete 8 hour shift she felt dizzy 
and then fell backwards with apparent loss of consciousness and 
struck the back of her head. She sustained a laceration and a 
cerebral contusion. Apparently she had no chest pain, 
palpitations, or shortness of breath. It is unclear whether her 
dizziness was vertigo or light headedness. 
PAST MEDICAL HISTORY: 
1. Partial thyroidectomy in 1973, now on chronic Synthroid 
therapy. 
2. Appendectomy in 1967. 
3. Spinal meningitis without sequelae in 1958.
 Ar\/ 
4. Brief syncopal episode many years ago while in a shower after 
getting over a cold. faj 
MEDICATIONS: Synthroid, one pink pill per day. 
ALLERGIES: None known. 
HABITS: None. 
SOCIAL HISTORY: 
The patient is married and has a new job at Stouffer's. 
EXHIBIT flAM 
Brunson, Reba 
Consultation Report 
Page 2 - Kevin J. Colver, M.D. 
REVIEW OF SYSTEMS: 
Otherwise negative except for significant hearing loss. 
PHYSICAL EXAMINATION: 
General: 
HEENT: 
Lungs: 
Cardiac: 
Abdomen: 
This is a sleepy white female with a left hearing aid. 
Head: She has a laceration on the back of her head. 
Eyes: The pupils are equal and round and respond to 
light. 
Ears: The tympanic membranes were difficult to 
visualize due to narrow canals. 
Throat: Clear. 
Clear. 
Normal SI and S2, 2/6 systolic murmur at the upper left 
sternal border. 
Bowel sounds present 
tender. 
The abdomen is soft and non-
Extremities: Without cyanosis, clubbing or edema. 
Neural: Mental status is alert and oriented. Cranial nerves II 
through XII show decreased hearing, otherwise intact. 
Motor strength is 4 to 5/5 in all extremities. Sensory: 
She has light touch sensation in all extremities. Deep 
tendon reflexes: There is a +2 left prepatellar and a 
trace right prepatellar reflex. Babinski's are absent. 
EKG shows possible left anterior fascicular block, 
otherwise normal. Chemistries include a glucose of 
137, LDH 200. CBC: WBC 6.2, hematocrit 39.4. CBC 
unremarkable. 
Laboratory: 
IMPRESSION AND PLAN: /t>« 
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Syncope. This is probably due to a generalized weakness and 
working too hard on her feet after getting over a bout of 
bronchitis. She may have also had some labyrinthitis with 
some vertigo which could have been exacerbated by the motion 
of the conveyer belt. There has been no arrhythmias rand no 
indication of other cause of syncope. The preliminary report 
f^ on the carotid ultrasound shows very trace left plaque and 
none on the' right. I would like to check some cardiac enzymes 
and also check the urinalysis. If these are negative, I do 
i* J* 
Brunson, Reba 
Consultation Report 
Page 3 - Kevin J. Colver, M.D. 
not feel strongly that any further for the workup for the 
cause of syncope is indicated. I do agree with the EEG as 
already ordered by Dr. Clark. 
21. History of thyroidectomy. Will resume her S>nthroid 0.2 mg 
QD. 
KEVIN J. COLVER, M.D. 
Verified By Electronic Signature 
KJC/cm 
D/ 12-7-93 13:41 
T/ 12-7-93 15:36 
ADDENDUM B 
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Kevin J. Colver, M.D. 
1120 East Highway 6, Suite 1 
Payson, Utah 84651 
March 21, 1994 
Reva Brunson 
91 South 200 East #4 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Dear Mrs, Brunson: 
In response to your questions in the letter dated 12 March 1994r 
you asked if my report states that you had inflammation of the 
inner ear prior to the accident. The letter from Mr. Keith F. 
Wahlquist dated 8 March 1994 states, "also he reported that you 
had an inflammation of the inner ear which could cause vertigo." 
Mr. Wahlquist is misquoting me. My note dated 7-7-93 says that, 
"she may have also have some labyrinthitis with some vertigo." 
Thus I did not say that you had an inflammation of the inner ear, 
I merely hypothesized that this was possible. 
There is no way of knowing from my reports or examination if you 
did have inflammation of the inner ear prior to the accident. 
I did feel the most likely cause of your fainting was, "due to a 
generalized weakness and working too hard on her feet after 
getting over a bout of bronchitis." My records indicate that you 
had a cough from which you were recovering when you went back to 
work and had the accident. The sentence in Mr. Wahlquists letter 
which states, "Dr. Kevin Colver reported that your fainting was 
probably due to your getting over a bout with bronchitis" is 
acqurate. 
Sincerely. 
Kevin J . C o l v e r , M.D. 
KJC/pj 
EXHIBIT "B" 
ADDENDUM C 
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MOUNTAIN VIEW HOSPITAL 
1000 East, U.S. Highway 6 
Payson, Utah 84651 
r ;.•'•*' " ' . . t M . !,«>»•• 
December 14, 1993 <s ' y 
To Whom It May Concern: 
Re: Reva Brunson 
Attending Physicians: John R. Clark, M.D. 
Kevin J. Colver, M.D. 
Mrs. Brunson is a 74-year-old woman that I saw in the Emergency 
Department on 12-7-93 after falling while working at a conveyer 
belt at Stouffer's. She had been working there for only two days. 
She did not feel »• any spinning sensation, simply became light 
headed, passed out, hit her head on the floor sustaining a 
contusion to her brain. She was admitted to the hospital. As far 
as I know, no other specific cause of the blacking out episode was 
found. Considering the nature of this work, I think that the most 
likely cause of her passing out was motion sickness due to watching 
the conveyer belt go past her. 
Sincerely, 
L. Dean Egbert, M.D. 
Emergency Room Physician 
Mountain View Hospital 
LDE/cm 
D / 1 2 - 1 4 - 9 3 9 : 3 7 
T / 1 2 - 1 4 - 9 3 1 0 : 4 5 
EXHIBIT "C" 
ADDENDUM D 
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x\evjLsea 7/93 
Industrial Commission of Utah-Adjudication Division 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor, P.O. Box 146615 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615 
ft (801)530-6800 
SUMMARY OF MEDICAL RECORD 
(to be completed by treating physician) 
EVALUATION FOR:. 
DATE OF INJURY: 
l \ ^ i / V u ISrt^v^Srh. 
"7 \\a^ (? j^r EMPLOYER 
1. Has applicant been released for usual work? 4A? What date?_ 
2. Has applicant been released for light duty? A/O What date?_ 
3. Applicant was required to be off work from ~7 D ^ c tS to fres^y** 
4. Has applicant a permanent injury? A^7 
5. In case of permanent injury, on what date did or will the applicant reach 
a final state of recovery? 
6. If there is a permanaent injury, give your estimate of impairment in terms 
of percentage of loss of function: — 
7. Is there a medicallly demonstrative casual relationship between the 
industrial accident and the problems you have been treating? ^eJ Please 
explain as necessary: b Q«r~f~- C^G^ c^c^sj/<rv% a^r^T^i^j^C. 
8. What future medical treatment will be required as a result of the 
industrial accident? ^Mc>^r^T)Vv> oh C*s 
9. What is the percentage of permanent physical impairment attributable to 
previously existing conditions, whether due to accidental injury, disease 
of congenital causes? /* 
10.What is the applicant's total physical impairment, if any, resulting from 
all causes and conditions, including industrial injury? 
11 Did the industrial injury aggravate the applicant's pre-existsing 
condition? Please explain as necessary: A^/'fy' 
Dated this  * *- day of Arpri f 19 «Y 
Physician's.Name (please print) Phys ic ian ' s-*5peci/a 
cian's Signat 
P h y s i c i a n ' s-*5peci/alty 
Physi ure 
Pa^s^ OV SV6J? 
City/St£te/Zip 
Street Address 
Physician's Telephone Number 
/ „ (iT-tJ (dj /io re-ftr-fC^'v^s u
 cf 2L /Me* /??«/ 
ADDENDUM E 
20 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 94-180 
REVA BRUNSON, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
STOUFFER FOODS CORP. and/or 
TRAVELERS INSURANCE, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND ORDER 
HEARING: Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 
160 East 3CO South, Salt Lake City, Utah on August 
31, 1994 at 10:00 o'clock a.m. The hearing was 
pursuant ^o Order and Notice of the Commission. 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES j 
Benjamin A. Sims, Administrative Law Judge. 
present The applicant, Reva Brunson, 
represented herself pro se. 
was and 
The defendant employer, Stouffer Foods, and its 
insurer, Travelers Insurance, were represented by 
Steven Aerchbacher, Attorney at Law. 
The applicant, Reva Brunson, claims medical expenses and 
temporary total disability. The applicant was initially scheduled 
for a hearing on July 15, 1994. She has a profound hearing loss 
and wears hearing aids. Because her hearing aids were in for 
repair, she was unable to ^ ear the proceedings, and elected, after 
considerable discussion, to delay the hearing until August 31, 
1994. 
On August 31, 1994, arrangements were made by Travelers 
Insurance to have a stenographic reporter present who provided a 
lap top computer by which the applicant could see on a computer 
screen all of the discussion that transpired in the hearing room. 
In addition, as back-up, the Industrial Commission provided a 20 
inch computer screen by which typed questions could be shown to the 
applicant. The 20 inch screen was not necessary since the 
applicant could adequate1a read on the lap top computer screen what 
was transpiring during the session. 
The defendants submitted an additional document on September 
27, 1994, and the applicant submitted her response to it on 
September 30, 1994. The rase was considered ready for an Order on 
October 3, 1994. 
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This case involves a fall at work. The 75 year old applicant, 
who looks younger than her age, had been working for Stouffer Foods 
(Stouffer) for only three days at the time of her injury. During 
her work for Stouffer, her shift was from 3:00 o'clock p.m. to 
11:00 p.m. She was getting less sleep than she normally got, and 
although she had rested prior to going to work, her sleep pattern 
had been disturbed. MR at 16. At the time of her injury, she 
recently had a cough without fevers, chills, sweats, or sore throat 
from which she was recovering. She was working overtime. Her job 
was to stand next to a conveyer which transported frozen food and 
to readjust boxes as they came down the conveyer belt. On the 
night of the industrial incident, she had a meal break from 7:30 to 
8:00 p.m. in the cafeteria. 
At about 12:13 a.m., the applicant recited that she felt fine. 
She had been standing during her shift, and during her overtime. 
She looked up at the ceiling lights, and then at the boxes as they 
moved along the conveyor belt. Sometime thereafter she stated that 
she began to feel "light headed". ' She did not feel ill, nor did 
she feel faint. She has no recollection of what happened, but she 
fell backwards, hitting her head on the tile floor. She was placed 
on a stretcher and transported to the Payson Hospital where she was 
hospitalized for three days. 
The applicant had previously worked as a supervising 
seamstress. She had also worked for Carlisle Foods. After a long 
period being out of the work force, she went to work for Stouffer. 
Stouffer instructed all of its employees, including the applicant, 
that if they were injured they were to go to see a company nurse, 
and if they were feeling ill they were to tell a supervisor or 
trainer. 
On the day of this incident, the applicant had been up since 
6:00 a.m. that morning. The doctor's notes indicate that the 
applicant had been awake for 20 hours at the time of the industrial 
incident. Although the applicant denied that she had been up for 
20 hours, from 6 a.m. to 12 midnight is 20 hours. The applicant 
recited that she rested before she went to work. She claims that 
her problem stemmed from a lack of carbohydrates and attributes her 
fainting to lack of foods high in carbohydrates in Stouffer's 
cafeteria, and the movement of the conveyor on which she adjusted 
the food boxes. 
The defendant employer provides free food to its employees, 
but does not tell them what to eat. The employees may choose such 
food items as they desire. Offered are entree items, salads, 
cereals, snacks, breads, peanut butter, and normal food items 
carried by cafeterias including numerous other carbohydrates. The 
employer is not responsible for providing its employees food. 
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The applicant was adamant at the hearing in expressing her 
physical endurance and ability to work for extended periods of 
time. In fact, subsequent to her injury, the applicant recited 
that she had worked from 7 a.m. to 5 p.m. in May 1994 for several 
days moving heavy boxes from a storage area. 
The applicant also asserted that her problem with fainting and 
falling while at work at Stouffer was due to the fact that she had 
an extra undershirt on, and that the additional clothing caused her 
to get too warm. 
Victoria Nelson, a registered nurse employed by Stouffer Foods 
for seven years, testified that she has had other people on another 
conveyor line who have become nauseous or light headed. On the 
other conveyor line, the movement of the belt will make people 
light headed. Many of the people who become light headed have been 
pregnant. No one has had fainting or light headedness problems on 
the conveyor line on which the applicant was working to the 
knowledge of Ms. Nelson. The applicant's conveyor line was 
designed differently. 
The applicant suffers from previously existing long standing 
Hypacusis, and Hypothyroidism which is under control by replacement 
medication. Subsequent to the fall, Dr. David T. Roberts found an 
abnormal EEC He reported that some of the forms appear 
"suspiciously epileptiform in character." MR at 49 & 8. It is not 
clear from the medical records whether this abnormal EEG occurred 
as a result of the fall, or was present prior to the fall. 
On December 7, 1993, Dr. Colver reported that he suspected 
that the fall was due to a syncope based upon a generalized 
weakness due to resolving "bronchitis and possibly due to mild 
labyrinthitis exacerbated by working on her feet at a moving 
conveyor belt all day." MR at 53. 
Dr. Clark gave her work releases through March 17, 1994. At 
the time he released her to return to work on March 17, 1994, he 
indicated that she had a post-concussion syndrome which was 
subsiding, as well a slight left ulnar neuropathy. She told Dr. 
Clark that she was afraid to return to work because she works swing 
shift, and at this time of the evening she is most tired and does 
not feel well. She claimed that if she could return to work during 
the day shift that she could handle it because during the day she 
is able to lift items and do her house work. MR at 19. 
The preponderance of the evidence shows that Mrs. Brunson's 
injury coincidentally occurred at work because of her idiopathic 
condition without any enhancement from the workplace. Although 
there has been speculation about why she had the fainting episode, 
there is no evidence which has been set forth which meets the 
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standard of a reasonable medical probability. 
Prior to and at the time of her syncopal episode and fall, 
Mrs. Brunson was not engaged in any activity which created any 
strain, exertion, or stress greater than that of her normal 
nonemployment life or the normal nonemployment life of any other 
person. Her syncopal episode and injury did not result from any 
strain, exertion, or stress related to her employment. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
1. Mrs. Brunson was not injured by accident arising out of 
and in the course of her employment with her employer. 
2. Neither Mrs. Brunson's employment nor any activities 
related thereto were the legal cause or medical cause of her 
injury. 
3. The fall was related to a syncopal episode. 
4. Mrs. Brunson is not entitled to workers' compensation 
benefits as set forth in U.C.A. Sect. 35-1-1 et sea. 
DISCUSSION: 
The general rule concerning causation is that an employee 
cannot recover for a physiological malfunction which is not 
job-induced and which could have happened as easily away from work 
as at work. Thus, in Sabo's Electronic Service v. Sabo. 642 P.2d 
722, 723-24 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court denied recovery for 
a herniated disc caused by preexisting back problems from another 
job, and which manifested itself when the employee engaged in 
lifting activities which were not strenuous and could have happened 
anywhere. Accord Billings Computer Corp. v. Tarango, 674 P.2d 104 
(Utah 1983); Farmers Grain Co-op. v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237 (Utah 
1980); Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Ind. Comm'n 
and Thurman, 590 P.2d 328 (Utah 1979) ; see also Nuzum v. Roosendahl 
Construction and Mining Corp., 565 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1977); Redman 
Warehousing Corp. v. Ind. Comm'n. 22 Utah 2d 398, 454 P.2d 283 
(Utah 1969). 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that a different rule applies, 
however, where because of some non-occupational internal weakness 
(such as a fainting spell), an employee falls and sustains an 
injury from the fall. Kennecott v. Ind. Comm'n and Georgas, 675 
P.2d 1187 (Utah 1983). The Court stated, however, that the Georgas 
case did not present the question, and for that reason the Court 
did not decide whether an idiopathic fall to level ground and 
resulting injuries were compensable. Id. at FN 4. Compare, e.g.. 
Williams v. Ind. Comm'n, 38 111.2d 593, 232 N.E.2d 744 (1967) 
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(recovery for fall to level floor denied), with Lovett v. Gore 
Newspapers Co. , Fla., 419 So.2d 306 (1982) (recovery allowed). The 
instant case presents the instance of a fall to a level tile floor. 
It will be helpful to first review the statute germane to this 
case. The Utah statute in effect at the time of the injury states 
in pertinent part: 
Each employee ... who is injured ... by accident 
arising out of and in the course of his employment, 
wherever such injury occurred,... shall be paid 
compensation .... 
U.C.A. Sect. 35-1-45 (1988). 
The statute requires an accident "arising out of and in the 
course of" employment. Id. (emphasis added). It is not sufficient 
to have an injury which occurred ir) the course of employment, but 
which did not arise out of the employment. There is no question, 
but that the head injury occurred in the course of her employment. 
However, the question based upon the facts of this case, is whether 
the arising out of prong has been met. The arising out of 
requirement might be met out of the hardness of the tile floor as 
an added employment hazard. A. Larson, Law o f Workmen's 
Compensation, Sect. 12.14(e)(1994). As Professor Larson discusses, 
a china dish might survive if dropped on the kitchen linoleum, but 
would not have a chance on the ceramic tile floor of a factory. 
Of the five cases allowing a level-floor award, one involved 
a tile floor (General Ins. Corp. V. Wichersham, 235 S.W.2d 215 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1951), three involved a concrete floor (Smith v. 
Container Gen. Corp., 559 So.2d 1019 (Miss. 1990); Employers Mut. 
Liab. Ins. Co. v. Ind. Ace. Comm'n, 41 Cal.2d 676, 263 P.2d 4 
(1953); George v. Great Eastern Food Prod., 44 N.J. 44, 207 A.2d 
161 (1965), and one involved a "hard wood" floor (Pollock v. 
Studebaker Corp.. 97 N.E.2d 631 (Ind. App. 1951). These cases 
indicate that the arising out of prong is satisfied by a physical 
impact with a floor which was the immediate cause of the injury. 
However, the great majority of cases deny recovery where the 
injury occurred upon a tile or concrete floor because these types 
of floors are common outside the work environment, and these types 
of floors present risks which are not unique to work. See e.g. , 
Oldham v. Ind. Comm'n, 139 111. App. 3d 594, 93 111. Dec. 868, 487 
N.E. 693 (1985)(the diagnosis was a transient loss of consciousness 
of unknown etiology, and the necessity of standing and the presence 
of a clay tile floor were not risks greater than those outside of 
the employment). 
In the instant case, there is insufficient evidence to show 
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that the injury arose out of the employment. There was no showing 
that the applicant's employment posed a risk to her that was 
greater than that to which she would be exposed as a member of the 
general public. There are many homes and businesses which have 
concrete and ceramic tile floors, and had she fainted in any of 
them, her injury would have been as severe. Under the 
circumstances, as much as I would like to give her an award, there 
is unfortunately no legal basis for recovery since the medical 
evidence does not show by a preponderance that her fainting was 
caused by her employment. 
ORDER: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the claim filed by Reva Brunson for 
injuries filed as a result of a fall on December 7, 1993 while 
working on the premises of Stouffer Foods Corporation must be 
dismissed with prejudice since it did not arise out of her 
employment for Stouffer Foods Corporation. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the 
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and 
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not 
subject to review or appeal. In the event a Motion for Review is 
timely filed, the parties shall have 15 days from the date of 
filing with the Commission, in which to file a written response 
with the Commission in accordance with U.C.A. Section 63-46b-12(2). 
DATED THIS / &L day of October 1994. 
ilAL COMMISSIOJJ^F^dTAH 
fjamjAi A. Sims" (/ 
'Administrative Law Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the / \ day of October, 1994, the 
attached ORDER in the case of Reva Brtinson was mailed, postage pre-
paid to the following persons at the following addresses: 
Reva^Brunson 
91 S 200 E #4 
Provo UT 84606 
Steven Aeschbacher, Atty 
PO Box 45385 
SLC UT 84145-0385 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
4^1/1 ( o^x^A^ \^' 
June S. Harrison, Paralegal 
Aanudication Division 
/jsh 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
REVA BRUNSON, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
STOUFFER FOODS CORPORATION and 
TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
Reva Brunson asks The Industrial Commission of Utah to review the 
Administrative Law Judge's decision denying her claim for benefits 
under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. 
The Industrial Commission of Utah exercises jurisdiction over this 
Motion For Review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. 
§35-1-82.53, and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Commission adopts the findings of fact set forth in the 
decision of the ALJ, summarized below. 
Ms. Brunson had worked at Stouffer Foods for only three days prior 
to the accident in question. The accident occurred on December 7, 1993 
while she was assigned to adjust packages of frozen food that passed by 
on a conveyor belt. Without warning, she fainted and struck her head 
on a tile floor. As a result of the fall, Ms. Brunson suffered a 
concussion and required overnight hospitalization. 
Ms. Brunson can only speculate as to the cause of her fainting 
spell. She has submitted a written statement from Dr. Colver that "the 
most likely" cause of the incident was "a generalized weakness and 
working too hard on your feet after getting over a bout of bronchitis." 
She has also submitted a written statement of Dr. Egbert that "the most 
likely" cause of her accident was "motion sickness due to watching the 
conveyor belt go passed (sic) her." Finally, Dr. Clark states "there 
is a medically demonstrative causal relationship between the industrial 
accident and the problems for which (Ms. Brunson) was treated." 
However, Dr. Clark provides no explanation of his conclusion. 
Based on the foregoing evidence, the ALJ concluded that Ms. 
Brunson had failed to establish that her fainting and resulting injury 
"arose out of and in the course of" her employment at Stouffer Foods. 
The ALJ therefore held that her injury was not compensable under the 
Utah Workers' Compensation Act. 
* 
* ORDER DENYING 
* MOTION FOR REVIEW 
* 
* 
* 
* Case No. 94-0180 
* 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Utah Workers' Compensation Act provides compensation to 
workers who are injured by accident "arising out of and in the course 
of" their employment. (Utah Code Ann. §35-1-45.) It is the worker's 
burden to prove that his or her employment is both the medical and the 
legal cause of injury. Allen v. Industrial Commission, 72 9 P. 2d 15 
(Utah 1986). The focus of this case is on the requirement of medical 
causation, which requires Ms. Brunson to prove that her work at 
Stouffer Foods was the medical cause of her injury. 
Ms. Brunson herself cannot explain why she fainted at work. 
Likewise, her physicians' statements do not reveal any reasonable 
medical certainty regarding the cause of her fainting. In fact, Dr. 
Colver and Dr. Egbert arrive at two different conjectures to explain 
the incident. Under these circumstances, the Commission agrees with 
the ALJ's conclusion that Ms. Brunson has failed to establish medical 
causation. 
As noted above, it is Ms. Brunson's burden to prove medical 
causation. Because she has not done so, the Commission must deny her 
claim for workers' compensation benefits. 
ORDER 
The Commission affirms the decision of the Administrative Law 
Judge and dismisses Ms. Brunson's Motion For Review. It is so ordered. 
Dated this / ~) day of February, 1995. 
Colleen S. Colton 
Commissioner 
IMPORTANT! NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS FOLLOWS ON NEXT PAGE. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW 
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NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Commission to reconsider this Order by 
filing a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission within 20 days 
of the date of this Order. Alternatively, any party may appeal this 
Order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a Petition For Review with 
that Court within 30 days of the date of this Order. 
CERTIFICATION OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 
REVIEW in the matter of Reva Brunson, Case No. 94-0180, was mailed, 
first class, postage prepaid this / *? day of February, 1995, to the 
following: 
WAYNE A. FREESTONE 
PARKER, FREESTONE, ANGERHOFER & HARDING, P.C. 
BANK ONE TOWER 
50 WEST 3 00 SOUTH, SUITE 900 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
STEVE J. AESCHBACHER 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
70 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
P 0 BOX 45385 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84145-0385 
REVA BRUNSON 
91 SOUTH 200 EAST #4 
PROVO, UTAH 84606 
Orders\94-0180 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on day of July 1995, I caused to be 
mailed by First-Class Mail, postage pre-paid, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Motion For Review to the following: 
Steven Aeschbacher, Esq. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on day of July 1995, I caused to be 
mailed by First-Class Mail, postage pre-paid, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Motion For Review to the following: 
Steven Aeschbacher, Esq. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main 
Sal t Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
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Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment 
5. Illness, Disease: An illness may be considered to be 
the summation of the physical, mental, and other 
kinds of factors that are involved in an individual's 
less than optimal health status. A disease may be 
considered to be the specific pathophysiologic 
processes involved, which give rise to the individual's 
signs and symptoms and their progression.' 
6. Employ ability: This is the capacity of an individual 
to meet the demands of a j ob and the conditions of 
employment associated with that j ob as defined by an 
employer, with or without accommodation. 
7. Employ ability Determination: This is an assessment 
by management of the individual's capacity, with or 
without accommodation, to meet the demands of a 
job and the conditions of employment. The manage-
ment carries out an assessment of performance capa-
bility to estimate the likelihood of performance failure 
and the likelihood of incurring liability in case of 
human failure. If either likelihood is too great, then 
the employer may not consider the individual employ-
able in the job. 
8. Medical Determination Related to Employability: This 
is the process of evaluating the relationship of an 
individual's health to the demands of a specific job 
as described by the employer, such as demands for 
performance, reliability, integrity, endurance, or 
prolonged service. The physician must ensure that 
the medical evaluation is complete and detailed 
enough to draw valid conclusions with respect to the 
individual's capability of meeting the job's demands 
and carrying out essential j ob functions. 
The physician's tasks are to (1) identify 
impairments that could affect performance and deter-
mine whether or not the impairments are perma-
nent; and (2) identify impairments that could lead 
to sudden or gradual incapacitation, further impair-
ment, injury, transmission of a communicable dis-
ease, or other adverse occurrence. 
In estimating the risk factors, the physician should 
indicate whether or not the individual represents a 
greater risk to the employer than someone without 
the same medical condition and should indicate the 
limits of the physician's ability to predict the likeli-
hood of an untoward occurrence. 
9. Risk, Hazard: A risk represents the probability of an 
adverse event; a risk must be weighed together with 
the consequences of the adverse event. An individ-
ual's activities or characteristics, and biologic, physical, 
or chemical factors, may increase the risk of morbid-
ity or mortality. 
A hazard is a potential source of danger, to a 
woman contemplating crossing the Atlantic Ocean 
in a rowboat, the Atlantic presents a serious hazard. 
Excessive numbers of coliform bacteria or Shigella 
dysentenae in the public water supply present a hazard 
to a city. 
10. Possibility, Probability .These are terms that refer 
to the likelihood or chance that an injury or illness 
was caused or aggravated by a particular factor. 
"Possibility" sometimes is used to imply a likelihood 
of less than 50%; "probability" sometimes is used 
to imply a likelihood of greater than 50%. 
Social Security Disability Determinations 
Although the Social Security system predated the 
first Guides edition and is not based on the Guides, a 
description of the system is included here to compare 
and contrast the ways in which medical information 
is used under each approach.The Social Security 
Administration (SSA) has national responsibility 
under Public Law 74-271 for the administration of 
both the Social Security disability insurance program 
(title II) and the supplemental security income (SSI) 
program (title XVI). Every person who pays into 
Social Security contributes to the Social Security 
Disability Trust Fund. 
The title II program provides cash benefits to 
disabled workers and their dependents who have 
contributed to the trust fund through the FIGA tax 
on their earnings. A person qualifies under the title 
II program because of financial need. The title XVI 
program provides for a minimum income for the 
needy, aged, blind, and disabled. Under that pro-
gram, financial need is indicated by limitation of 
income and resources to a level that is equal to or less 
than an amount specified in the law. 
Definitions and Terms 
Under the title II and title XVI programs, the defini-
tions of disability are essentially the same. The law 
defines disability as "the inability to engage in any 
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically 
determinable physical or mental impairment that 
can be expected to result in death or has lasted or 
can be expected to last for a continuous period of 
not less than 12 months (Section 223 [d] [1] [A]). 
The law may apply to infants and children as well as 
adults. In terms of the law, a person is either disabled 
or not disabled. 
To meet the definition of disability, an individ-
ual's impairment or combination of impairments must 
be of such severity that he or she not only is unable 
to do the work previously done, but also cannot per-
form any other kind of substantial gainful work con-
sidering the individual's age, education, and work 
experience (Section 223 [d] [2] [A]). Substantial 
gainful work means any work that involves significant 
and productive physical or mental activities and is 
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